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| President Paul Kagame |
Rwanda is often touted as an example of what African states could
achieve if only they were better governed. Out of the ashes of a
horrific genocide, President Paul Kagame has resuscitated the economy,
curtailed corruption and maintained political stability.
This is a record that many other leaders can only dream of, and has
led to Rwanda being cited as an economic success story that the rest of
the continent would do well to follow.
In countries
like Kenya and Zimbabwe some have argued that their leaders should
operate more like Kagame. In other words, that job creation and poverty
alleviation are more important than free and fair elections.
In
response, critics have sought to puncture Kagame’s image by pointing
to human rights violations committed under his leadership. This is an
important concern. But the notion that the Rwandan model should be
exported also suffers from a more fundamental flaw: it would not work
almost anywhere else because the necessary conditions – political
dominance and tight centralised control of patronage networks – do not
apply.
The Rwandan model
Many of the achievements of
Kagame and his governing Rwandan Patriotic Front party are impressive.
He took over a deeply divided nation in desperate need of economic and
political reconstruction in 1994. Since then, Kagame has established
firm personal control over Rwandan politics, generating the political
stability needed for economic renewal.
Instead of sitting back
and waiting for foreign investors and the “market” to inspire growth,
the new administration intervened directly in a process of state
directed development. Most notably, his government kick started economic
activity in areas that had previously been stagnating by investing
heavily in key sectors. It has done so through party-owned holding
companies such as Tri-Star Investments.
Combined with the careful management of agriculture,
these policies generated economic growth of around 8% between 2001 and
2013. Partly as a result, the percentage of people living below the
poverty line fell from 57% in 2005 to 45% in 2010. Other indicators of
human development, such as life expectancy and literacy, have also
improved.
An example for Africa?
Despite the impressive headline figures, a number of criticisms have been levelled at the Rwandan model.
Most
obviously, it sacrifices basic human rights – such as freedom of
expression and freedom of association – to sustain the ruling party’s
political hegemony. The Rwandan system therefore involves compromising
democracy for the sake of development. That decision may be an easy one
to make for those who enjoy political power, but is often rejected by
the opposition.
Less obviously, the use of party-owned enterprises to kick start
business activity places the ruling party at the heart of the economy.
It also means that when the economy does well, the already dominant
Rwandan Patriotic Front is strengthened. This empowers Kagame to
determine who is allowed to accumulate economic power, which in turn
undermines the ability of opposition leaders and critics to raise funds.
These
arguments have been around for some time. But they have done little to
dampen the allure of the Rwandan model for
some commentators and leaders.
Given this, the strongest argument
against exporting the Rwandan model is not that it is undemocratic and
gives the ruling party tremendous economic power. It’s that it won’t
actually work.
Can’t work everywhere
One of the most
rigorous efforts to understand the political conditions that made the
Rwandan model possible has emerged from the African Power and
Politics research project led by David Booth, Tim Kelsall and others.
They argue that Kagame’s government is an example of “developmental
patrimonialism”. In this system, the potentially damaging aspects of
patrimonial politics are held in check by a leader who enjoys tight
control over patronage networks. These include jobs for the boys, waste
and inefficiency.
This authority needs to be established both
internally and externally. External political control is required
because the threat of electoral defeat by a strong opposition party may
force the government to prioritise short-term survival over long-term
investments. Internal control is required because the absence of checks
and balances on the ruling party is likely to exacerbate corruption.
When
these conditions hold, elements of patrimonialism may be economically
productive by generating resources that are channelled back into the
system. In the Rwandan case, the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s economic and
political dominance has not undermined development because the funds
generated through party-owned enterprises have often been reinvested in
the economy.
Unintended consequences
The problem is that
these conditions don’t hold in most African states. With a few
exceptions such as Chad and Angola, the ruling party cannot aspire to
the level of dominance witnessed in Rwanda because the opposition is too
strong for this degree of political control to be sustained. In Kenya
and Zimbabwe, for example, the opposition has consistently won a large
share of the legislative and presidential vote.
In addition, even
some states that feature more dominant ruling parties have consistently
failed to impose economic discipline on their governments. Instead,
entrenched clientelism and internal factionalism have typically
undermined anti-corruption efforts. This is true for
both Angola and Chad, hurting efforts to reduce poverty and boost
economic growth.
Shorn of the internal and external political
control required to make it work, the application of the Rwandan model
elsewhere would generate very different results.
Extending the
control of the ruling party over the economy is more likely to increase
graft and waste than to spur economic activity. And efforts to
neutralise opposition parties are likely to be strongly resisted,
leading to political instability and economic uncertainty.
What
this means is that if other countries on the continent try to implement
the Rwandan model, the chances are that they will experience all of its
costs while realising few of its benefits.
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Disclaimer: Comment expressed do not reflect the opinion of African Parliamentary News