Why PAP’s Senegal Mission Matters for the Malabo Protocol’s Ratification

PAP’s West African Regional Caucus will visit Senegal from 28 September to 1 October 2026 to advance the Malabo Protocol and other AU treaties. Senegal has signed the Protocol but has yet to ratify it.

The Pan-African Parliament’s (PAP) West African Regional Caucus will visit Dakar from 28 September to 1 October 2026 to advocate the ratification and implementation of African Union legal instruments. Led by Caucus Chairperson Hon. Lazare Yao Yao, the delegation will place particular emphasis on the revised Protocol relating to the Pan-African Parliament, known as the Malabo Protocol.

Senegal is a significant destination for that campaign. It signed the Protocol on 2 June 2021, but the AU’s published treaty status list does not record a Senegalese ratification or deposit of an instrument of ratification. The planned meetings offer PAP an opportunity to discuss what steps remain and how Senegal’s National Assembly could help move the process forward.

What would the Malabo Protocol change?

Adopted by AU heads of state and government on 27 June 2014, the Malabo Protocol revises the legal framework governing PAP. Its most prominent provision describes PAP as the AU’s legislative organ. That description requires qualification: the Protocol does not give PAP an unrestricted power to enact binding laws across Africa. Under Article 8, the AU Assembly would determine the subjects on which PAP may propose draft model laws, and those proposals would go to the Assembly for consideration and approval.

The Protocol would also strengthen PAP’s role in examining matters referred to it by AU policy organs. It provides for PAP to receive and consider reports, discuss its budget and the AU budget, give opinions on referred draft legal instruments, and liaise with national and regional parliaments. These provisions would give a clearer treaty basis to parliamentary participation in AU affairs, while leaving important decisions with the Assembly and other competent organs.

Changes to PAP’s composition are also consequential. The revised Protocol provides that at least two of each member state’s five PAP representatives must be women, compared with the one-woman minimum under the existing framework. It also envisages a different method of selecting members, including election by national parliaments or other deliberative bodies from outside their membership pending arrangements for direct elections. Those changes have not taken effect because the revised Protocol has not entered into force.

Ratification remains the obstacle

The Protocol enters into force 30 days after a simple majority of AU member states deposit their instruments of ratification with the Chairperson of the AU Commission. With 55 AU member states, that threshold is 28 deposits. In a February 2025 decision, the AU Assembly said 13 further ratifications were needed, indicating a total of 15 at that point. PAP had likewise reported 15 ratifications in October 2024.

The distinction between signature, ratification and deposit matters. A signature signals a state’s intention to consider the treaty. Ratification is its formal consent through the required national process; depositing the instrument with the AU records that consent for the Protocol’s entry-into-force calculation. Senegal has signed, but its ratification is not recorded in the AU status list.

Where does West Africa stand?

The AU’s published country-by-country status list, dated 19 September 2023, records deposits by seven West African states: Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. It records Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal as having signed without ratifying. Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Nigeria are recorded without a signature or ratification. PAP subsequently identified Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal as targets for West African advocacy missions and stated in October 2024 that Côte d’Ivoire had yet to ratify.

Status in the AU’s published 2023 country list	West African states
Ratification instrument deposited	Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo
Signed; ratification not recorded	Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal
Neither signature nor ratification recorded	Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria

The table reflects the dated AU country list confirmed as of September 2026. The later AU Assembly decision confirms that the continental threshold remained unmet in February 2025.

West Africa has played a prominent role in the Malabo Protocol’s ratification campaign. Seven of the 15 ratifications identified in the AU’s February 2025 decision came from West African states: Benin, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. Yet eight other states in the region had no ratification recorded in the AU’s published country-by-country list. The region has therefore helped advance the Protocol while retaining considerable scope to move it closer to the 28 ratifications required for entry into force.

Senegal presents a particular opportunity because it signed the Protocol on 2 June 2021. Signature expressed its support for considering the instrument, but it did not complete ratification. The delegation’s visit can help establish where the process now stands: whether the text has undergone the necessary government review, what role the National Assembly must play under Senegalese law, and what further steps would be required to deposit an instrument of ratification with the AU Commission.

The discussions could also give Senegalese officials and lawmakers space to examine the Protocol’s institutional implications. These include PAP’s proposed role in developing model laws for the AU Assembly’s consideration, the method of selecting PAP members, and the requirement for at least two women in each five-member delegation. Identifying any questions about these provisions would allow PAP to respond to them directly, rather than treating ratification as a procedural formality. A clear account of the remaining steps and of who is responsible for each would be a useful outcome of the Dakar mission.

A wider treaty agenda

The mission will also address the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; the AU Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons; instruments concerning the rights of persons with disabilities and the right to a nationality; and protocols associated with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The discussion on free movement comes at a time when hostility toward African nationals in other African countries has exposed a gap between the continent’s integration commitments and people’s lived experience. In September 2026, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights expressed concern about reported attacks, intimidation and harassment of foreign-owned businesses in Kenya, particularly those operated by Burundians. It urged the authorities to protect those affected and to enforce immigration and business laws in accordance with due process, equality and non-discrimination.

Reports of attacks on Nigerians and other African nationals in South Africa have also strained relations with Nigeria. The Nigerian National Assembly’s recent suspension of official legislative visits to South Africa shows how hostility toward migrants can disrupt cooperation between African institutions as well as threaten individuals and their businesses.

States retain the authority to regulate entry, residence and business activity. That authority must be exercised without encouraging violence or denying people the protection of the law. The African Commission has emphasized that rights to dignity, security and non-discrimination extend to foreign nationals, including migrants, regardless of their immigration status.

These events give the treaty discussions a practical urgency. Trade across Africa depends on people being able to travel, establish lawful businesses and work without fear of attacks based on their nationality. Ratifying a free movement instrument is one step; protecting people, investigating violence and applying national laws fairly are essential to making continental integration credible.

The PAP delegation plans to meet Senegalese officials, parliamentarians and other stakeholders to explore cooperation with the National Assembly on ratification, incorporation into domestic law and implementation. Those discussions can also address how parliaments scrutinize the treatment of fellow Africans within their borders and respond when xenophobia undermines the commitments their governments have made.