Nigeria’s 2027 Elections: ACDEG, Political Pluralism and the State’s Duty to Protect Opposition Rights

As Nigeria approaches the 2027 elections, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights impose obligations to protect political pluralism, opposition rights, free participation and credible elections.

As Nigeria moves towards the 2027 general elections, an increasingly important question is emerging from the crises engulfing the country's opposition parties: where does ordinary partisan competition end and the State's legal obligation to preserve democratic political pluralism begin?

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu and officials of his administration have repeatedly rejected allegations that the Federal Government is engineering the collapse of opposition parties or seeking to turn Nigeria into a one-party state.

There is an important distinction that must be acknowledged at the outset.

The Federal Government has no obligation to make the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Labour Party (LP), African Democratic Congress (ADC), Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC), or any other opposition party electorally successful. It is not government's responsibility to resolve their internal disagreements, select their leaders, finance their campaigns or make it easier for them to defeat the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC).

Indeed, President Tinubu is entitled, as a politician seeking re-election, to campaign vigorously for his party and defeat his opponents at the ballot box.

But Nigeria, as a State, cannot be neutral about whether genuine political pluralism survives.

That is because Nigeria has assumed binding obligations under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

Article 3(11) of ACDEG expressly requires States Parties to implement the Charter according to the principle of strengthening political pluralism and recognizing the role, rights and responsibilities of legally constituted political parties, including opposition political parties. Articles 4 and 6 additionally require States to promote democracy, rule of law and human rights and ensure that citizens enjoy fundamental freedoms. Article 17 requires independent and impartial electoral institutions and conditions for transparent, free and fair elections.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights reinforces these obligations through Article 9 on expression, Article 10 on association, Article 11 on assembly and Article 13 on citizens' right to participate freely in government.

Nigeria ratified both instruments. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights has additionally been incorporated into Nigerian law through the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act.

The question ahead of 2027 is therefore not whether President Tinubu must help his opponents. He plainly does not.

The question is whether institutions exercising the authority of the Nigerian State must remain neutral and protect the democratic environment within which his opponents are entitled to organize and attempt to defeat him.

The answer, under Nigeria's constitutional and African treaty obligations, must be yes.

Osun and the Obligation to Prevent Political Violence

Events immediately preceding the August 15, 2026 Osun governorship election illustrate another dimension of that responsibility.

A video circulated in which Senator Francis Fadahunsi, the APC senator representing Osun East, appeared to call upon supporters to kill members of the opposition Accord Party. Fadahunsi subsequently said his comments had been misinterpreted and that he meant APC supporters should politically "kill" the opposition through their votes. The controversy nevertheless prompted the Osun State Police Command to summon him, with the police confirming that an investigation had been directed.

The significance of such an incident goes beyond partisan rhetoric.

A democratic State has a responsibility to ensure that elections are conducted in an environment free from violence, intimidation and threats against political opponents.

ACDEG requires States Parties to promote democracy, rule of law and human rights and to ensure that citizens enjoy their fundamental freedoms. Its provisions governing democratic elections cannot meaningfully be satisfied where citizens fear violence for supporting an opposition party.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights adds the State's obligations to protect life, personal security, association, assembly, expression and political participation. This means the appropriate standard is not determined by the political affiliation of the person accused of threatening violence.

If an opposition politician publicly incites violence against APC supporters, the State should act. If an APC politician publicly incites violence against opposition supporters, the State should act with equal seriousness. That is what political neutrality under the rule of law requires.

The police investigation reported after the Fadahunsi controversy is therefore important. But the ultimate test is whether allegations of electoral violence are investigated promptly, impartially and consistently, irrespective of the political status of the alleged perpetrator.

Religious and Ethnic Intimidation: The State's Duty to Protect Political Participation

The obligation to preserve political pluralism does not end with protecting political parties from institutional interference. It also requires the State to protect the citizens, candidates and communities whose freedom to participate makes political pluralism possible.

Recent statements by religious and ethnic activists raise increasingly serious questions about whether the Nigerian authorities are responding consistently to rhetoric capable of intimidating voters or excluding citizens from political participation on grounds of religion, ethnicity or political preference.

Sheikh Jingir and the Politicisation of Religion

In August 2026, prominent Islamic cleric Sheikh Sani Yahaya Jingir generated controversy with remarks supporting the continuation of the Muslim-Muslim presidential ticket ahead of the 2027 elections.

At a gathering in Kano attended by political leaders, including the governors of Kano and Jigawa States, Jingir defended President Bola Tinubu's Muslim-Muslim ticket and reportedly described Christians as “infidels”, urged Muslims to unite politically and invoked their claimed numerical strength as justification for continuing the Muslim-Muslim arrangement. He was also reported to have urged Muslims to “show infidels their limit.”

The remarks provoked condemnation from Christian leaders and other Nigerians concerned about the increasingly explicit mobilization of religious identity for electoral purposes.

Sheikh Ahmad Gumi subsequently defended Jingir's right to advocate a Muslim-Muslim ticket, while describing his position as partly a product of the religious tensions in his environment. Gumi nevertheless cautioned against mixing religion with Nigeria's politics.

There is an important distinction here. A Muslim cleric is entitled to hold political opinions. A Christian cleric is equally entitled to do so. Religious leaders may support candidates and participate in public debate.

But religious freedom and political expression do not confer an unlimited licence to advocate the political subordination of citizens of another faith or create an atmosphere in which Nigerians are told that their religion makes them inherently unfit to exercise political authority.

Nigeria is constitutionally a multi-religious State. Political leadership does not belong to Muslims, Christians or adherents of any particular faith.

The State therefore has an obligation to ensure that the approaching election does not become a contest in which religious identity is weaponised to intimidate citizens or deny the legitimacy of candidates because of their faith.

That responsibility derives not merely from Nigeria's Constitution but also from the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and ACDEG, both of which Nigeria has ratified.

The Shafiy Adeba Sermon Raises an Even More Serious Question

An even more disturbing video circulated in August involving a Yoruba-speaking Islamic cleric identified in reports as Shafiy Adeba.

The cleric was reported to have claimed that Muslims possess religious authority to enslave non-Muslims, confine those he described as “infidels” to their homes and use violence against them. The remarks generated calls for police investigation and arrest, including from Lere Olayinka, media aide to FCT Minister Nyesom Wike, who condemned the sermon as extremist.

The allegations are sufficiently serious that the authorities should establish the authenticity and full context of the recording and determine whether any criminal law has been violated.

The principle should again be politically and religiously neutral.

A Christian preacher advocating violence against Muslims should face the same legal scrutiny as a Muslim preacher advocating violence against Christians.

The State's responsibility is not to police theological disagreement. It is to prevent advocacy from crossing the legal boundary into incitement to violence, persecution or the denial of other citizens' fundamental rights.

That distinction becomes particularly important during an election cycle in a country with Nigeria's history of religious and communal violence.

Sunday Igboho and the Right of Opposition Candidates to Campaign Everywhere in Nigeria

Religious intimidation is not the only concern. In March 2026, Yoruba Nation activist Sunday Adeyemo, popularly known as Sunday Igboho, publicly declared support for President Tinubu's re-election and warned opposition figures, including Peter Obi and Atiku Abubakar, against campaigning in the South-West.

In the widely reported remarks, Igboho declared his support for Tinubu's second term and warned against bringing opposition candidates into “Yorubaland”. The comments attracted criticism precisely because they appeared to suggest that a part of Nigeria could be politically closed to candidates opposed to the incumbent President.

That proposition is fundamentally incompatible with democratic elections. The South-West does not belong politically to President Tinubu. The South-East does not belong to Peter Obi. The North-East does not belong to Atiku Abubakar.

And no ethnic, religious or regional activist has the authority to determine which duly nominated presidential candidate may campaign in any part of the Federal Republic. Every candidate lawfully nominated for the presidency must be able to travel throughout Nigeria, address citizens and solicit their votes without intimidation.

The responsibility for guaranteeing that freedom belongs ultimately to the State.

Silence in response to threats against opposition campaigning can therefore become significant not necessarily because silence establishes governmental complicity, but because the State has a positive obligation to protect the political rights being threatened.

The MC Oluomo Precedent and the Lessons of 2023

The concern is particularly acute because Nigeria has already experienced the consequences of ethnic rhetoric during elections.

During the 2023 Lagos elections, Musiliu Akinsanya, popularly known as MC Oluomo, was recorded making remarks widely interpreted as threatening Igbo voters who would not support the APC.

In one widely circulated recording before the governorship election, he warned those unwilling to vote for the APC to remain at home. He subsequently said that the remark was a joke directed at an acquaintance known as “Iya Chukwudi.” Police announced that they were investigating the statements.

There were also documented reports during the 2023 elections of voter intimidation and ethnic discrimination at some Lagos polling units, including incidents involving pro-APC supporters and voters perceived to be Igbo or opposition supporters.

Care is necessary here. It would go beyond the presently established evidence to attribute every incident of voter suppression in Lagos personally to MC Oluomo. But his public remarks, combined with documented incidents of ethnic voter intimidation, demonstrate why authorities cannot dismiss threatening electoral rhetoric as harmless political theatre.

Words spoken immediately before an election can influence conduct on Election Day. That lesson should inform preparations for 2027.

The Issue Is Selective Enforcement, Not the Religion or Ethnicity of the Speaker

These incidents collectively present a test of the State's neutrality. The question is not whether Sheikh Jingir is Muslim. It is not whether Sunday Igboho is Yoruba. It is not whether MC Oluomo supports President Tinubu. And it is not whether a threatening statement comes from the APC or the opposition.

The appropriate question is:

Would the Nigerian State respond in substantially the same manner if identical statements were made by someone supporting an opposition candidate?

Imagine a Christian cleric publicly declaring that Muslims should never be permitted to govern Nigeria. Imagine an Igbo activist warning President Tinubu that he would not be allowed to campaign in the South-East. Imagine an opposition organizer warning Yoruba voters to remain at home unless they intended to vote against the APC.

The reaction of law-enforcement authorities to those hypothetical situations provides a useful benchmark against which their response to actual incidents should be measured. The rule of law loses its democratic legitimacy when its application depends upon whose political interests are served by the conduct concerned.

ACDEG Makes Prevention of Electoral Intimidation a State Responsibility

This is where these incidents connect directly with Nigeria's obligations under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.

Article 3 requires respect for human rights and democratic principles, the rule of law, free and fair elections, effective participation of citizens and the strengthening of political pluralism. Article 4 requires States Parties to promote democracy, rule of law and human rights. Article 6 requires States Parties to ensure that citizens enjoy fundamental freedoms and human rights. Article 17 requires States to reaffirm their commitment to regularly holding transparent, free and fair elections.

Those obligations cannot be satisfied merely by protecting ballot boxes. An election cannot meaningfully be described as free if a Christian voter believes his religion makes him a target.

It cannot be free if an Igbo citizen fears violence for voting against the governing party. It cannot be free if an opposition candidate is threatened for campaigning in a particular region. And it cannot be genuinely competitive if intimidation is tolerated when it benefits one political side but punished when directed against another.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights reinforces this obligation through its protections of equality, dignity, security, expression, association, assembly and political participation.

Article 13 is particularly important because it guarantees every citizen the right to participate freely in the government of his or her country.

The word “freely” matters. Political participation undertaken under threat of religious persecution, ethnic retaliation or physical violence is not free political participation.

Condemnation Is Important, but Enforcement Is the Real Test

Government condemnation of inflammatory rhetoric is valuable. Indeed, some political and religious leaders including the APC National Chairman and the Sultan of Sokoto have publicly warned against religious division following the Jingir controversy.

But statements alone cannot discharge the State's obligations where conduct crosses into credible threats or incitement to violence.

Law-enforcement authorities must investigate objectively and, where the evidence satisfies the applicable criminal-law threshold, prosecute without regard to the political affiliation of the speaker or beneficiary.

This is where the history of the MC Oluomo controversy remains relevant. Police announced investigations into his 2023 remarks, but the broader democratic question is whether threats and intimidation connected with elections consistently produce meaningful accountability.

The same standard should apply to every political camp. If Senator Francis Fadahunsi's statements warrant investigation, they should be investigated. If a religious preacher advocates violence against members of another faith, that should be investigated.

If a Tinubu supporter threatens opposition candidates seeking to campaign in the South-West, the authorities should assess whether the statements cross the threshold into unlawful intimidation.

And if an opposition supporter makes equivalent threats against APC candidates or supporters, exactly the same standard should apply. This is not about protecting the opposition from political criticism.

It is about protecting the democratic space in which government and opposition must compete peacefully.

The State Cannot Outsource Political Intimidation

There is also a broader principle that Nigeria must confront before 2027. A government would plainly violate democratic principles if its officials directly threatened opposition voters.

But the State cannot escape its responsibilities simply because intimidation is carried out by private supporters, ethnic activists, religious leaders or political proxies rather than public officials.

The government's obligation includes reasonable measures to protect citizens against interference with their political rights by non-State actors. That does not mean government is responsible for every reckless statement made by one of its supporters.

Nor does failure immediately to prosecute every controversial speaker prove partisan complicity. But where threats become credible, repeated or capable of producing electoral violence, persistent institutional inaction becomes relevant.

The issue then becomes whether the State is exercising due diligence to protect democratic participation. That is especially important where the threatening rhetoric expressly benefits the incumbent political party.

Political Pluralism Ultimately Belongs to the Citizen

This brings the argument back to the central theme of Nigeria's obligations under ACDEG. Political pluralism is not merely about protecting the PDP, ADC, Labour Party, NDC or any other opposition organization.

It is ultimately about protecting the Nigerian citizen's right to choose between competing political alternatives. That right becomes meaningless if citizens can be threatened because they are Christian.

It becomes meaningless if Muslims are told that voting for a Christian candidate betrays their faith. It becomes meaningless if Igbo voters fear retaliation for rejecting the governing party.

And it becomes meaningless if opposition candidates cannot campaign freely in parts of the country because ethnic or political activists have declared those territories the exclusive electoral property of the incumbent.

The responsibility of government is therefore not to guarantee that opposition parties win. It is to guarantee that Nigerians remain free to make them win if that is their democratic choice.

That is the distinction between protecting an opposition party and protecting political pluralism.

And as Nigeria moves towards 2027, the consistency with which the State responds to political, religious and ethnic intimidation may become one of the clearest tests of whether it is meeting the democratic obligations it voluntarily assumed under ACDEG and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.

The NDC Case and Access to Political Competition

The controversy surrounding the Nigeria Democratic Congress provides another example of why events occurring months before the general election matter.

In December 2025, the Federal High Court sitting in Lokoja ordered INEC to register the NDC as a political party. INEC subsequently complied with the judgment and publicly confirmed the party's registration.

In June 2026, however, the same Federal High Court set aside its earlier judgment following an application by the Peace Movement Party, which argued that it had a legal interest in the dispute and should have been joined in the original proceedings.

The court held that necessary parties had not been heard and ordered that the substantive case begin afresh with INEC, PMP and NDC participating. The NDC challenged the ruling and maintained that its political activities and status could not simply be extinguished.

The merits of that litigation are ultimately for the courts to determine. But its democratic significance should not be overlooked.

A political party that has organized members, held congresses, nominated candidates and prepared for an election can suffer irreparable political consequences if its legal status remains uncertain while electoral deadlines continue to run.

This is precisely why Article 17 of ACDEG requires States to establish and strengthen mechanisms for the timely resolution of election-related disputes.

A judicial remedy delivered after the relevant nomination or electoral deadline may be legally correct but democratically ineffective.

The PDP: When Internal Party Crisis Meets State Institutions

The PDP provides perhaps the most complicated example. The party has suffered prolonged internal divisions since the 2023 elections. Those divisions cannot simply be attributed to the Federal Government. Political parties bear responsibility for their own internal democracy, discipline and cohesion.

But critics of FCT Minister Nyesom Wike have long alleged that his continuing influence within the PDP, despite serving in an APC-led Federal Government and openly supporting President Tinubu politically, has contributed substantially to the party's inability to reorganize into a coherent opposition force.

Those remain political allegations and should be described as such.

What is established is that the PDP's November 2025 national convention became entangled in conflicting judicial proceedings. The convention proceeded in Ibadan on November 15 and 16 despite an existing Federal High Court judgment restraining it. Another court had meanwhile issued orders permitting the convention to proceed and directing INEC to monitor it.

The controversy eventually reached the Supreme Court.

On April 30, 2026, the Supreme Court invalidated the Ibadan convention, holding that it had been conducted in defiance of the subsisting Federal High Court judgment and criticising the decision to obtain relief from another court of coordinate jurisdiction rather than challenge the adverse order through the appellate process.

There is an important rule-of-law principle here: court orders must be obeyed until set aside, even where a party believes that the court issuing them lacked jurisdiction.

But there is an equally important democratic concern.

Where conflicting judicial orders and prolonged litigation repeatedly determine the leadership and organizational capacity of major opposition parties, the judiciary itself can inadvertently become part of the political battlefield.

This requires exceptional institutional caution.

The courts must protect rights and enforce the law. But judicial processes should not become instruments through which political actors achieve indirectly what they cannot achieve through internal democratic competition.

Labour Party and the Cost of Institutional Delay

The Labour Party's prolonged leadership dispute presents a related issue. On April 4, 2025, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment recognizing Julius Abure as national chairman, holding that questions concerning party leadership were internal party affairs over which the courts lacked jurisdiction.

Yet controversy over recognition of the party's leadership persisted.

In January 2026, the Federal High Court directed INEC to recognize the Nenadi Usman-led caretaker committee, holding that evidence demonstrated that Abure's tenure had expired. INEC subsequently recognized the Usman-led leadership.

Again, one need not decide which LP faction was politically right to recognize the larger democratic problem.

An electoral commission has legitimate statutory responsibilities regarding political parties. But prolonged uncertainty over which officials it recognizes can materially affect a party's ability to organize, submit candidates, interact with the Commission and prepare for elections.

Under Article 17(1) of ACDEG, Nigeria is obliged to maintain an independent and impartial national electoral body. INEC therefore must do more than insist that it has no partisan intention. Its decisions and their timing should demonstrate even-handedness and respect for binding judicial decisions.

The Attempt to Deregister Five Opposition Parties and the Court of Appeal's Warning

Another development that deserves particular attention in assessing the pre-2027 political environment is the litigation that threatened the continued existence of five opposition political parties: the African Democratic Congress (ADC), Action Peoples Party (APP), Action Alliance (AA), Accord Party and Zenith Labour Party (ZLP).

The suit, filed at the Federal High Court in Abuja by the Incorporated Trustees of the National Forum of Former Legislators, sought the deregistration of the parties on the ground that they had failed to satisfy the electoral-performance requirements under section 225A of the Constitution. The plaintiff contended that the parties had failed to meet the constitutional thresholds necessary to retain their registration.

The affected parties challenged aspects of the proceedings and approached the Court of Appeal. On 22 May 2026, the appellate court directed the Federal High Court to stay further proceedings pending determination of the appeals before it. That should ordinarily have brought proceedings before the lower court to a halt.

It did not.

Despite the subsisting order of the Court of Appeal, Justice Peter Lifu of the Federal High Court proceeded with the case and, on 15 June 2026, delivered judgment directing INEC to deregister all five parties and prevent them from participating in subsequent elections, including the 2027 general elections.

The response of the Court of Appeal was extraordinary.

The following day, the appellate court stayed execution of the judgment and strongly criticized the trial judge for proceeding despite its earlier directive. It characterized what had occurred as the highest form of “judicial impertinence” and held that proceeding in disregard of the superior court's order amounted to “judicial rascality.”

The matter did not end there.

On 28 July 2026, the Court of Appeal went further and completely set aside the Federal High Court judgment. In a unanimous decision, the appellate court held that the lower court had wrongly assumed jurisdiction and that the action upon which the deregistration order was based was incompetent because it had been instituted by a non-juristic entity. The Court consequently restored the registrations of all five political parties.

This episode has significance far beyond the fortunes of the five affected parties.

An independent judiciary must remain free to decide cases against political parties, including opposition parties. ACDEG does not immunize political parties from compliance with the Constitution or electoral law, nor does the protection of political pluralism mean that a political party can never lawfully be deregistered.

But the rule of law operates in both directions.

Political parties must obey the law, but courts themselves must operate within jurisdiction, respect judicial hierarchy and comply with binding orders of superior courts.

This becomes particularly important where a judicial decision has the potential to remove political parties altogether from an approaching general election. Had the Federal High Court judgment remained effective, five opposition political parties including the ADC, which had emerged as a significant platform for opposition mobilization ahead of 2027 would have been prevented from participating in subsequent elections.

The democratic consequences could therefore have been profound.

The episode also demonstrates why Article 17 of ACDEG, which requires mechanisms for the timely resolution of election-related disputes, must be read together with Article 3(2) on constitutionalism and the rule of law and Article 3(11) on strengthening political pluralism and recognizing the role and rights of opposition political parties.

Judicial independence is indispensable to democracy. But independence does not mean freedom from the constitutional hierarchy of courts. Where a superior court has ordered proceedings to stop, a lower court cannot simply proceed because it disagrees with that order.

The Court of Appeal's unusually severe language, describing the conduct as judicial impertinence and judicial rascality, therefore raises a larger institutional concern as Nigeria approaches 2027.

What would have happened to political competition if the appellate process had not intervened quickly?

The question is especially important because electoral calendars do not wait for litigation.

Political parties must register members, conduct congresses and primaries, nominate candidates, organize campaigns and comply with statutory deadlines. Even an ultimately reversible judicial decision can cause irreversible political damage if it prevents a party from meeting an electoral deadline.

This is why the effectiveness of judicial remedies should not be measured merely by whether an erroneous judgment is eventually overturned. In an electoral context, timing is itself part of the remedy.

A party restored to the ballot after nominations have closed, campaigns have concluded or an election has been conducted may have won its legal case while losing the political right the litigation was supposed to protect.

The ADC deregistration litigation therefore provides a concrete illustration of the argument at the heart of this article:

Nigeria's 2027 elections are already taking place within its courts, regulatory institutions and political institutions long before Nigerians arrive at polling units.

And it demonstrates why protecting political pluralism requires more than allowing opposition parties formally to exist. It requires institutions including the judiciary to ensure that disputes capable of determining whether political parties can participate in elections are resolved lawfully, independently and in sufficient time to prevent judicial processes themselves from becoming instruments through which political competition is effectively decided before election day.

The ADC and a Remark That Deserves Serious Attention

Perhaps the most politically revealing incident concerns the African Democratic Congress. In April 2026, a video emerged showing President Tinubu's Chief of Staff, Femi Gbajabiamila, addressing House of Representatives member Leke Abejide during the ADC's internal leadership struggle.

Gbajabiamila encouraged Abejide to remain in the ADC rather than defect, telling him to fight those seeking control of the party and to "scatter" them. He added: "We like what you are doing. Continue."

The statement attracted criticism precisely because Gbajabiamila is not merely an APC politician. He is Chief of Staff to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, occupying one of the most influential positions within the Presidency. His comments do not establish that the Federal Government engineered the ADC's internal crisis.

But they raise a legitimate question.

Why should a senior official at the heart of the Presidency publicly encourage a member of an opposition party to remain inside that party and "scatter" those attempting to consolidate its leadership?

The incident becomes more significant when viewed against Article 3(11) of ACDEG. Nigeria has undertaken to strengthen political pluralism and recognise the role and rights of opposition political parties.

There is an obvious tension between that obligation and a senior presidential official publicly expressing approval of efforts to destabilize a competing political organization.

But the Gbajabiamila episode makes it reasonable to demand particularly close scrutiny of any subsequent involvement by state institutions in those disputes.

“It Is a Pleasure to Witness You in Such Disarray”

President Tinubu's own words also deserve examination in this context. Addressing the National Assembly on Democracy Day in June 2025, the President rejected allegations that his administration wanted a one-party state.

He expressly stated that “a one-party state is not in the offing, nor should it ever be.” That is an important commitment.

But in the same address, discussing the problems facing opposition parties, Tinubu said he would not help them put their houses in order and added that it was “a pleasure” to witness the opposition in disarray.

There is nothing unlawful about a politician enjoying the political difficulties of his opponents.

But there is an important difference between Tinubu the APC politician and Tinubu the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The former has every right to want the APC to defeat its competitors. The latter presides over a State that has undertaken an international legal obligation to preserve political pluralism.

That distinction matters enormously.

Is “All Fair in Politics”?

The distinction resurfaced during President Tinubu's July 2026 meeting with the Catholic Bishops' Conference of Nigeria. Discussing political opponents seeking to remove him in 2027, the President said:

“All is fair in politics, and it's equal opportunity.”

He added that he would not give opponents a “red carpet” and that they would “wrestle each other to the finishing point.” He simultaneously defended INEC as neutral.

As ordinary political rhetoric, the President's determination to fight vigorously for re-election is entirely legitimate. But as a statement of democratic principle, all is not fair in politics.

Election violence is not fair. Political intimidation is not fair. Selective prosecution is not fair. Using state institutions to destabilize opponents is not fair. Discriminatory restrictions on rallies are not fair. Unequal access to state-controlled media is not fair. Manipulating electoral institutions is not fair. And using public authority to prevent viable opposition parties from competing effectively would not be fair.

ACDEG establishes precisely these boundaries.

Politics may be competitive. Democracy may be adversarial. Elections are contests for power. But the State itself must remain within the law.

The Government Does Not Have to Help the Opposition, But the State Must Protect Opposition Rights

This is the distinction that should guide debate ahead of 2027. President Tinubu does not have to build a strong PDP. He does not have to reconcile Labour Party factions. He does not have to strengthen the ADC. He does not have to campaign for the NDC. And he certainly does not have to make it easier for any candidate to defeat him.

But the institutions under his government have different responsibilities.

INEC must be impartial. The police must protect APC and opposition supporters equally. Security and anti-corruption agencies must enforce the law without partisan selectivity. State-controlled media must provide fair and equitable access during elections. Regulatory authorities must apply campaign rules without discrimination.

Government officials exercising public authority must distinguish between the interests of the State and those of the APC.

And the judicial system must remain an independent arbiter rather than become a battlefield through which political competition is decided by serial and conflicting injunctions.

Those are not favours to the opposition. They are obligations of a democratic State.

Political Pluralism Means More Than Having Many Parties on INEC's Register

There is another danger in reducing this debate to whether Nigeria has formally become a one-party State.

ACDEG does not merely require the legal existence of multiple political parties. It requires the strengthening of political pluralism.

A country could have twenty registered parties but little meaningful pluralism if state institutions systematically render nineteen incapable of challenging the incumbent.

Conversely, one party could win overwhelmingly without violating democratic principles where opposition parties remain genuinely free to organize, campaign and persuade voters to remove it.

The proper test is therefore not the number of parties. It is the reality of political competition.

Can opposition parties organize? Can they choose their own leaders in accordance with law? Can they hold meetings and rallies? Can they communicate with voters? Can they obtain fair access to state-controlled media? Can they nominate candidates without arbitrary administrative interference? Can they challenge government decisions before genuinely independent courts? Can their members participate without intimidation or violence?

And can they realistically defeat the incumbent if enough Nigerians vote for them? Those questions determine whether political pluralism actually exists.

The Cumulative Effect Cannot Be Ignored

No single controversy discussed here proves that the Tinubu administration is deliberately dismantling Nigeria's opposition. That conclusion would require evidence.

Some opposition crises are plainly self-inflicted. Political parties frequently suffer from poor internal democracy, personal ambition, factionalism and litigation initiated by their own members.

The State cannot be blamed for every opposition failure. But the opposite conclusion would also be premature.

Democratic erosion rarely occurs through one spectacular act. It can emerge from the cumulative effect of numerous apparently isolated actions.

One court injunction. One delayed administrative recognition. One political prosecution. One restricted rally. One unusually expensive advertising requirement. One intervention in an opposition leadership dispute. One senior government official encouraging an opposition member to “scatter” his own party.

Viewed individually, each may have an explanation. Viewed cumulatively, patterns may emerge. That is precisely why scrutiny of Nigeria's compliance with ACDEG must begin before the 2027 elections.

The 2027 Election Is Already Underway

The credibility of Nigeria's next general election will not be determined exclusively by BVAS machines, ballot papers, collation centres and election-day security. It will also be determined by what happens to political competition between now and election day.

Nigeria voluntarily ratified continental legal instruments requiring democracy, human rights, political pluralism, free political participation and independent electoral institutions.

Those commitments bind the Nigerian State regardless of which political party controls the Presidency.

The Federal Government therefore cannot simply say that the problems of opposition parties are none of its concern. Their internal political problems may indeed be none of government's concern.

But whether Nigeria maintains a democratic environment in which opposition parties are genuinely free to exist, organize and compete is absolutely the concern of the Nigerian State.

That is the line ACDEG draws.

President Tinubu is entitled to fight politically for re-election. The APC is entitled to defeat the PDP, LP, ADC, NDC and every other challenger through persuasion and the ballot box.

But the State must remain the State. Its institutions cannot become weapons in that political contest. And that may ultimately be one of the most important tests of Nigeria's democracy as 2027 approaches.